Dan Russo Interview Transcript

MATT JACOBSON: Ok, and just as a start, can you give me the kind of the thumbnail biographical sketch -- just who you are, and where you're from, and what you've, kind of, where you work and what you've done with your life. DAN RUSSO: I was born in West Warwick, Rhode Island. Spent my childhood years in Madison, Connecticut. Went to college in Boston at Boston University, studied accounting and finance. Spent the early part of my career in the retail industry, in the apparel manufacturing industry. Spent the subsequent years working Wall Street, initially at [ _____ ] and [ _____ ] in an equity research capacity as their sell-side broker-dealers. I then moved to a hedge fund environment, and I worked there for the past, roughly 10 years, at [ _____ ] and at [ _____ ]. MJ: OK. Now. DR: I'm married, I have two children that are now 14 and 15, and I live on the Upper West Side of Manhattan. MJ: And you are how old yourself? DR: 41. MJ: 41, OK. MJ: Everyone I've talked to can agree that this is a kind of extraordinary moment in American history, although what people mean by that can vary quite a bit. So when I talk about our current moment, can you just tell me kind of what resonates for you? What do you think that phrase means here in the fall of 2009? DR: Sure, I think, well, first off it means that we have our first African American president. Second off, I think it means that we are at a very crucial point in our global decision on how to manage global warming and our planet and the environment. And then I also think we are at an interesting point nationally with respect to our economy, with the United States being the engine of growth for the world. With the United States being the engine of consumption for the world, and how that growth and consumption provided for a certain employment level and standard of living that I think is in jeopardy on some level. And I also think there is another thing going on which is this dramatic bifurcation in socioeconomic classes that took place over the last 10 years kind of coming to boil in light of the terrible financial crisis that ensued in 2008. MJ: OK. Well, I want to come back to Obama, because there's a lot to talk about there. But let's start with the financial crisis. You were in -- if not unique position at least kind of a specialized position to see it and watch it. Can you tell me kind of what those crucial months, going about just about a year ago now, what those months looked like from your office? DR: Sure. I would say that the most senior level, well-respected, most thoughtful, and conceivably the most financially successful group of people who were, for all intents and purposes, in charge of running the global financial system from New York, and through the broker-dealer network in New York, were many days, completely 100% confused, upside-down, uncertain, and panicked. Because all of the things that they had relied on as their guideposts or their road map for the way that various metrics went together, markets went together, liquidity ensued, was out the window. Nothing made sense, and it didn't make sense anymore because we had basically over-cooked the system, and people had to come to the realization that we had over-cooked the system. And the solution-- MJ: Can you say what you mean by over-cooked? DR: Sure. The amount of money that was lent by financial institutions to homeowners, and then effectively re-sold, and lent against again, and then re-sold, and lent against again was well, well, well beyond any one person or one organization's scope and understanding. And that proliferation of credit, and the proliferation of institutional marketable securities that went along with all of that credit issuance was such a large figure that the underlying quality that supported all of that lending was much lower than the agencies which were in business to rate that quality, and the investors who were in business to own those securities ever believed it could be. So, in fact, you had a system that was built around lending money to people who were not in a position to ever pay it back, and the asset that secured that loan was nowhere near, had the value, that it was given when the loan was made. And that loan had tentacles that just spread throughout the system in many different ways, shapes and forms. So that when the actual mortgage payments stopped being made by a certain percentage of the population in the United States, all of the lending that had taken place against those loans and assets caused a default and kind of a cataclysm of liquidity demand that the system could not meet. MJ: For most laymen, the kind of "oh shit moment" was the day that Lehman Brothers ended up on the front page of the New York Times. From being on the inside, do you remember-- DR: I think the "oh shit moment" was way before that. MJ: Yeah, I figured. So, can you talk about that. I mean, what were the signs? Or can you even, not just kind of in metrics, what were the signs, although I'm interested in that, but even more vividly, do you remember the moment that you saw something on your computer screen or you heard a piece of news that made you realize that the world was about to turn? DR: Yeah. For me, I mean, I think the stock market's behavior really starting in the second half of 2008 was clearly discounting something pretty terrible to come. And I think when I started to see global market -- I mean it wasn't just New York. It was New York, it was the Hang Seng, it was the FTSE, it was London, it was Hong Kong, it was South America. I mean there was this concerted sell-off in worldwide equity markets and credit markets. You realized that everybody was running for the door at the same time. And that started before Bear and before Lehman, and that was a large part of the reason I think why those two institutions ended up going away. So I guess the oh shit -- look, the "oh shit moment" for me was when I sat down and looked at the amount of loans, mortgage loans, that had to be refinanced between August and October of 2008 that had been issued four and five and six and nine years prior, that had all basically come to the point where the adjustable part of that mortgage would ratchet up to a interest rate level that no human being could ever pay against that level of asset, I think everyone realized that there's just no way we can ever get this amount of -- we can't get this much, you know, liquidity through the eye of the needle. That probably started to become evident early in 2008 -- even late 2007. MJ: And probably in kind of common knowledge within the circles of the people who do the kind of work that you do. DR: Absolutely. MJ: Was it talked about? DR: All the time. It was written in research, it was discussed over lunches and dinners and conferences. Yes, there's no doubt. Goldman Sachs would be kind of the mouth piece in terms of delivering large, well thought out research pieces which outlined how this was, in effect, a situation that was untenable for the whole globe. They started buying what was insurance against the future problem that was going to ensue. It was AIG who decided to write that insurance policy, which had a huge kind of impact on the world, subsequent to the fallout. MJ: Has your interpretation of what went wrong changed in the past year and a quarter or what ever it's been? DR: No. No. I mean it's really interesting. At the most simplistic level, it was greed run amok, and that's really, really what it was. But it wasn't one person's greed, it was the collective greed. It was the appraiser of the home that said the home was worth more than it was worth. It was the mortgage broker who gave the homeowner a mortgage option that enabled them to basically not have any payments or to have very, very low payments for the first one, two, three or five years of the loan. It was the homeowner who wanted to be in a home that probably cost more on a legitimate basis to finance than they could afford. It was municipal funds in foreign countries who wanted to generate more yield return for their pension holders and for their retirement accounts, and they were willing to buy securities that they didn't do as much due diligence on as they probably should have so that they could get a higher yield. It was absolutely 100% the investment banks who were generating enormous fees to package together all of these mortgage loans and sell them off to these municipalities, pensions, investments, retirement accounts, and they didn't own the paper subsequent to selling it off. So they were just consumed with the fees that they were generating for doing it. And it was the Fed, and it was the U.S. Treasury who were seeing enormous capital gains. And the capital gains were generating enormous short-term income, which was generating incremental income tax dollars, which was fueling incremental government spending, which was a huge part of the problem. So, everybody on some level -- not everybody, but many, many people, many, many different constituents were culpable. MJ: How do you understand the development of that situation? I mean it sounds like you're describing a kind of culture of over-grasping and over-reaching in these particular institutions or industries. DR: It goes back. Look, Bill Clinton overturned a law that had been on the books for 200 years prior to him, which was called Glass-Steagall. And basically, that limited the power of a broker-dealer, and left certain powers for financing, lending to the banks. When Goldman Sachs convinced Bill Clinton and all the constituents that went with that to overturn Glass-Steagall, they basically put a culture of manufactured fee generation in control of the financial destiny of the world. And that culture is about manufacturing fees at any expense It's a little simplistic after the fact to look at that culture and say, oh, God, how dare you do this, when, in fact, they never made any bones about what their 100% commercial intentions were. And there were no checks and balances within these organizations, they weren't built that way. So, I don't know, I guess your question is where did it start and why. It goes back to that. It was definitely about there were regulations and in the process of de-regulating finance, and the process of de-regulating the economy, which happened, you know, for the last 12 years, because we as a nation subscribe to the notion that less regulation and more free markets are a good thing 100% of the time for 100% of the people. It was one of our "oh shit moments" in terms of what the other side of that is. MJ: How come you never hear about Clinton in this whole, the kind of de-regulation saga. It's always taken back to Reagan, and I know that there are reasons for that. But how come, I mean the law-- DR: Because I think it's not consistent with what are "Democratic" platforms. I think the perception is that Republicans and people like Reagan and Bush were very much more proponents of free markets and lower taxes and just protecting the rich, which would imply those things. And I think that that's a definite misconception. MJ: OK, well, I think there's a fork here in the road in my own thinking, and I'm going to try to be able to cover both paths. The first has to do with in light of what you just said, how are you feeling about the bailout policies that we've seen in the last year? DR: I feel great about the fact that we did not become a Weimar Republic. We did not let ourselves go off the cliff, so to speak. We did not allow what happened, you know, whatever in '29 to happen again. I feel like it was hasty. I feel like there were people controlling the distribution and the structure of the bailout that may not, and I don't know if they did not, but they may not have had all of the right constituents and all the attentions. I think that many of the things that we ultimately want to get from the bailout, which is less "too big to fail," more oversight, less greed driving the system. I'm not sure we're going to get that from this bailout. I think there's a pretty big chasm between what Wall Street's perception and goals are, and Washington's perceptions and goals are, and I think they come together because of politics, but I don't necessarily think that, and I have not yet seen where there's that many people in Washington who are completely in sync with the realities of the capital markets the way that they're structured today. MJ: Can you elaborate on that? Can you say just if there's this kind of clash of understandings between Washington and Wall Street, what are the kind of basic views at stake here? DR: Well, I think that there's disdain right now from Washington and from a lot of Americans about the amount of wealth that was created on Wall Street, and the ramifications that the creation of that wealth had for many people who didn't get to participate. And I completely sympathize with that, I completely understand where those people are coming from. And I think that is probably the single biggest divide, because there are many people on Wall Street that might acknowledge that, but that have no legitimate intention of creating a situation that's dramatically different than the one that got them here. And I don't think it's the fact that people are bad by nature. I don't think that at all. I just think that people are Darwinian a little bit, and they're also self-serving, and they're also going to protect what they've built. And I think that it's too complicated for anyone to just say, OK, stop doing this, now do this. MJ: Right. The thing you'll hear kind of at street level among people, all sorts of people, who are outside of financial institutions, and I'm talking about people who are postal workers or college professors and anything between. But from the outside there's this impression that Wall Street is incredibly cynical, and that especially when it comes to the issues -- well, the kinds of things that have been on the front pages-- things like the CEO bonuses and those kinds of things. From where you sit, can you talk about the issue of cynicism on Wall Street? Because I imagine that it looks very different. DR: Yeah, I don't think that you can throw a blanket over this whole industry and all the really bright and decent people that are working in this industry, even at the highest levels, and say you're cynical. Because so many people are helping create and foster productivity, whether that's domestic productivity, international productivity, or just generally speaking are helping foster productivity. I mean in order to be an investor, you have to bet on a positive outcome the majority of the time. I mean most people are long biased, are longer term, are discounting a future outcome that's better than the outcome today. And that inherently is an optimistic point of view -- Warren Buffett bought Burlington Sante Fe. He said, this is a huge bet on America. So, I don't think they're cynical. I think there is a perception on Wall Street that power resides where the wealth is created, and that wealth is probably not going to get displaced dramatically, and as a result of that, power will continue to reside there. And wealth and power have a tendency of minding the store for themselves. And I do think that absolute power corrupts absolutely. I think if that whole notion of believing that the people with power and wealth, and the organizations and the institutions with power and wealth, will continue to perpetuate themselves, if that's cynical, then I guess that is consistent with cynicism. MJ: OK. A minute ago I said there was a fork in the road. I want to go back to that and kind of trace out one of the other paths, which is so for some number of months you've spent -- well, tell me a little bit about the circumstances of your work -- the work that you do. Are you most the time it's you and your computer? Are you most of the time with other people? Are you in meetings? How do you spend your time? DR: I would say my time is divided three ways. A third of my time is spent meeting with people who are involved with running businesses. And most of the businesses that they run are in the kind of consumer sector. So, they might operate a hotel, they might operate a department store, they might operate a restaurant franchise. So that's a third of my time. A third of my time is spent doing private primary due diligence, and it might be spent with one or two other people or three other people, but it's spent doing financial statement analysis. It's spent reading, it's spent just doing due diligence. Then the other third of my time is spent legitimately thinking about what investments make specific sense relative to those meetings and to that due diligence, and then to constructing this portfolio or this investment mosaic so that I can somehow generate a return from the other two things that I've done. MJ: Can you say -- kind of leaving behind the world that we've been talking about, which is the world of the metrics and policies and the big numbers, and just going to the kind of lived experience of you and your office and your colleagues and the people you come in contact with. Can you just talk about on a day-to-day level, how this period that we're talking about, the period since the onset of the economic crisis, how has that been different, or how does it feel in day-to-day experience to be in this kind of environment? And then how does it register with you? What are the ways that you notice it? DR: I think there's been a little bit of a cycle to it. So if you kind of went back to the beginning, whether it was late 2007, early mid-2008, I would say that there was disbelief, there was panic, there was shock, there was denial, there was anger. I mean, all of these emotions that take place when there's tragedy or loss. And it didn't matter how steeped in experience the person was, it didn't matter how wealthy that person was, it didn't matter how grounded or thoughtful. I mean generally speaking, most people, if they didn't outwardly panic, they panicked on the inside. They did things and said things and felt things and thought things that they were really not used to feeling, thinking or seeing. I think that that cycled a little bit. Because markets do gyrate -- they overshoot on both sides. And I think that there's been some -- not some -- I definitely know that there's been this relief that in a sense, the worst of it, whether it was February of 2009 or whether it was October 2008, the worst of it was an overshot, and there's a better than 50% chance, and maybe it's much higher probably than that, that we're probably not going off the cliff and we're probably not going to get into a situation that was, at that point in time, most feared. So, I guess the day-to-day, most people who did what I do had no idea what the future held for them. You kind of took a population of people who were very in control of their destiny, and were, on a relative basis, some of the highest compensated, well thought of industry folks, and you basically said everything that you thought you knew you don't know anymore, and everything that you took for granted and believed to be true about your, at least your career -- not anything else, but at least your career -- and our financial system, you better question it. So, that's a big deal. That's a big deal. And the subsequent fallout was huge. So many people couldn't take the stress and that manifested itself in a lot of different ways. I mean there were definitely folks who just couldn't deal when Bear Stearns went away and they lost everything they had in the world and they chose to do things really, really sad and dramatic. And then there were people who found new fields of interest and used the time to move on to other careers because they had had enough experience or they, frankly, just didn't like it any more. And then there were people that were forced out, and then there were people that were shut down. And this global mad rush for liquidity, people went and took money back anywhere they could. So even people who had managed their affairs properly saw some of this downturn coming, discounted in their portfolio structure, discounted in their business, they lost out too. MJ: What's the most surprising thing you've seen? I mean of all of these different reactions. DR: I think I'm most surprised about is the amount of money that Goldman Sachs has just made in the most recent quarter. And the fact that the system worked the way that it did in order to position them to get incrementally more income and wealth, and to have incrementally more market share through the process. I don't want to just say-- it's not just Goldman Sachs. I guess you could say similar things about the top ten large hedge funds, or the top -- and JP Morgan, for all intensive purposes, is in a similar situation. But I think the thing that I'm most surprised at is that Hank Paulson was driving the bus with respect to the bailout, and that AIG made good on the CDS to Goldman. And Goldman took TARP, didn't go away, paid back TARP quickly, and just had one of the best quarters in the history of the business and now is solely focused on trying to find a way to distribute all that money to, you know, five dozen people, which is a little bit disheartening in light of everything that transpired. MJ: Yeah. So, what are the lessons here? I mean, maybe not what's the moral here -- I kind of get that. But what are the lessons in terms of-- DR: I don't know. I mean look, capitalism in one sense is exactly what just happened. I mean, that is, like it or not you can't-- You can't like some of it and then not like some of it. That's the problem. So, I'm not smart enough to know what the lessons are. MJ: Well, let me put it this way. I mean I'm not rephrasing, I'm shifting. How has your own view of capitalism developed and shifted and changed and evolved over the years that you've been in this industry? DR: As I've gotten older in the business, I have come to realize more and more, so the concept has been reinforced, that -- and this isn't just true for broker-dealers and investment banks. This is really just true in capitalism and in business that scale is something that enables an organization to benefit dramatically, if it's managed a certain way. That holds true for global businesses that distribute diapers, it holds true for global businesses that distribute internet search, it holds true for businesses that distribute alcohol. And you can't underestimate the amount of people who will lobby for something and who will help make something happen if there is a commercial benefit, regardless of whether or not that is the right thing, the greater good, or the fair thing. I don't know if that means I'm cynical, but I guess it reinforces the notion that hard work is a huge, huge driver of success. But recognize the structure of the playing field, which is that scale and profit and that drives the bus. MJ: Well, this might be a perfect way to segue back to where we started, which was the first thing you said, in defining the moment we're in was the election of Barack Obama. Can you talk a little bit about first of all, why you lead with that? What does his election mean to you? And also how has that looked from your office? DR: What it means to me is that I think that the election of Barack Obama in some respects was a response by people to I think what I've just outlined, which is a level of national cynicism, a level of national displeasure with the forces that create some of these inequities. Having said that, I don't know if any administration, any person, or if this person, is in a position to change these things. And I'm not sure I'm smart enough or convinced that these things should, in fact, be changed by government. It's a slippery slope because if you take away free market and you take away people's ability to prosper and you start governing income of corporations and people and distribution of income and the way people spend their money, I think that it is very, very curious and probably inconsistent with what people perceive to be America. And these are really, it's just all stuff that's a little bit too confusing for me. But I'm not sure that this Administration isn't as political as any administration before it. There are probably many things about the negatives of some of the issues that I may have mentioned tonight that they would agree with, but you just can't, I don't know that there's an easy way to fix it. MJ: Has your perception of Obama changed over this-- DR: It has. Yeah, it has. MJ: OK. Can you just describe how and maybe the stages that you've gone through in your own thinking about him as a leader? DR: Sure. Initially I thought he was naive on a number of fronts, and that his administration was naive. And then I came to believe that he's extremely bright and extremely capable of surrounding himself with people who will educate him on many, many complicated issues, so that he can try to approach those complicated issues as best he can. And then I found him to be somewhat decisive in the way that he managed complicated issues. And, as time goes by, I've come to find him as concerned, if not more concerned than any of his predecessors, about getting re-elected, and that takes him a little bit away from his ability to always make the right decision relative to what I would assume he believed. And I think as time goes on, he's starting to become a little bit more of a politician. And I also would add that I think that his assumption that productivity, income and prosperity should be funneled down, regardless of desire, interest, support, productivity. I think that that over time has surprised me as well. I don't know. MJ: Well, so let's go back to primary season, election season about a year ago. At that time, how were you seeing him, and at that moment, if you can kind of erase-- DR: I saw Obama as someone who was in a unique position to harness all of this desire, and kind of harness all of this dissatisfaction, and use it to make some changes that weren't all socioeconomic. That were as much about getting us out of a war, and were as much about creating a system that was fair and protected the tenets of capitalism. So, I was enthusiastic, for sure. MJ: Were you -- I won't say alone, but-- DR: Oh, I would say that I was probably not in the majority within my professional setting. I think there were a lot of people, though, who wanted someone who was intelligent and thoughtful, regardless of what party they were in. I think that the experience had been so bad in the second term of George Bush, that people realized that they needed someone who was thoughtful. And even if they didn't always agree with every answer, that that was probably OK. MJ: You said that you see Obama already as being consumed with thinking about the next election-- DR: No, I mean there's an appearance of that. I don't know if -- look, I'm probably not in a position to say he is, and that, in fact, could not be the case, but there's the appearance that he's consumed with certain things that -- there are parts of Obama that are the exact same as all the people who came before him, and maybe that is just the nature of what you have to do to do this job and to get this job. So, I'm just not sure. MJ: Somebody once said, anybody who shows interest in the job should be disqualified because of that. Which may be so. Is there anything that you feel we should have talked about that we haven't? DR: No. Look, I think the fact that there is increasing amount of homelessness, an increasing amount of families going without food, an increasing amount of poverty at home, and that there is this continued bifurcation, I think that was, it's a by-product of an administration and a couple of administrations that probably over-protected one constituency for another. But I'm also not sure that that's not just the natural process of global growth. I mean you could sit back and argue about the fact that in other countries around the world, millions and millions of people have been living below the poverty line at a certain lifestyle for years and years and years and years, and as those countries start to come up the economic curve, that some of that, in effect, displaces the status quo in first world countries. I guess I'm not sure about all this. I'm kind of watching it and learning it as we go, and I don't like a lot of what I see, and it makes me feel like we should be doing something. But I mean I think we're just at a very, very interesting point on so many levels. I think that the way that industries are changing -- we didn't really talk about that. I mean you are displacing huge, huge industries, whether it's the auto industry, or at some point you made displace the music industry, or at some point you may displace the network TV industry, you're displacing movies. I mean the way the content's distributed, the way it's consumed. There's so many different things that, you know, I guess you could just say that this is Darwinism at work, and people who get it and people who've developed business models that capitalize on this new environment, whether they're from South America or China or Japan or the United States, it almost doesn't matter because the fields now level in terms of exploiting some of those business opportunities, capitals agnostic, that amidst all of this you have had some significant progress too. So it's hard to figure it all out. And we also didn't really talk about -- I mean it strikes me like a single largest issue facing all of us is the fact that we have this problem of global warming. I mean I think there's a lot of studies and there's a lot of people writing on it, there's a lot of people talking about it. And there's nations that are up in arms, and there's meetings going on in Copenhagen. But there's very little progress. And I guess that's the other thing that's hugely surprising to me. And it's commercial, it's not moral. It's not being managed as an ethical issue or a moral issue, it's being managed as a commercial issue, whereas countries are saying well, you're a first world country and you created a lot of this. Now my cattle are dying, I'm a third world country, you should be making restitution. And the first world country's saying I'm not going to make restitution, and you start doing this and I'll start doing this, and it's a quid pro quo that's getting us nowhere. It's just, it's classic but it's confusing. Anyway, that's more of a side bar. MJ: Well, but it opens up a couple of questions. One is -- I mean I was interested in what you said about capitalism as agnostic. Do you think that, is the nation state obsolete? DR: I don't know. I mean, I think for things like security, and I think for things like municipal necessities -- zoning, planning, transportation, garbage, and things like that. I think you need the nation state. So I don't think so. I think there's been way more evolution with respect to commercialization and industry, and then there's been evolution of the system that manages it. I think if you looked at all the agencies that the government set up, so many of them are the exact same agencies that they operated with 20, 30, 70, 200 years ago, and they're obsolete. So, whether it's a nation state is -- I don't know the word you used -- it's more of just there's some obsolescence that's happened that we kind of need to figure it out. But on the flip side, it's so unbelievably expensive to figure this out, while at the same time keeping in place all these regulatory bodies that are already there. You could make the same case that many of these government agencies and many of the spending that goes on through the government is just as backward and as confused and as misaligned as some of the stuff that we were criticizing going on on Wall Street. MJ: OK, last question. What do you think is the biggest thing that's changed in your lifetime? DR: The biggest thing that's changed in my lifetime is the digitization of all content and the way that people communicate, socialize, and receive and distribute content. So, it goes to the way people live their lives. That's absolutely 100% been a change that took place from the time I was, I want to say 18 until the time I'm 41. All of that change has happened inside of that period of time. And it's as significant of a change that any change that took place, it appears to me, the 500 years before. MJ: What are some of the ramifications -- both for better or for ill-- that you see attached to those changes? DR: Well, for better, it's absolutely the speed at which information travels. The ability of the United States to turn a lot of that change into industry and jobs and prosperity. And some would argue that it's led to a richer life for a lot of people, whether it's -- I'm sure that people make that argument. I mean I find that argument a little bit two-sided, because you could look back and you could have read the Odyssey by Homer back then or you could read the Odyssey by Homer now-- I mean certain things that are classic remain classic and literature's literature. And the things that we learned back then and the lessons we learned back then are no different. I think the things that are negative are the way that young people socialize today. I don't like it. MJ: You say that only because you're a father. DR: I know. I don't really like it, I don't really think it's healthy. The whole idea of actually picking up a phone and talking to someone and having an at-length conversation is reduced. MJ: To 140 characters. DR: Yeah. Because that's what fits in a text message. So I mean I think there's that. I also think that the way that people consume their media, and I think that the interest that people have in certain media content is, it's ridiculous. And that's total opinion. That's just me. That's an editorialization. MJ: What's an example of something ridiculous? DR: The balloon thing. [The 24-hour new cycle had recently been dominated by a false story about a young boy being whisked away in a weather balloon.]  Or something like that. Or the fact that Paris Hilton boyfriend's strangling her in her limousine on Halloween. I shouldn't know that. I don't want to know that. So, I just find the way that information is distributed. And the outlets that are willing to distribute anything now, versus some period in history where there was some respect for what was true news, hyperbole, what was gossip -- there's no filter anymore because everything is about eyeballs. MJ: And if they can't fact check it, they report what someone else has reported. DR: So, I think that that's a real down side to some of what we've gone through. MJ: Well, thank you very much. DR: No problem.

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